tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3744768872499365778.post5220788281844878862..comments2023-04-27T05:28:48.949-05:00Comments on Thoughts, Essays, and Musings on the Civil War: Hood’s Tennessee Campaign: Last Act in the West, Part 1Bobhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05632564881164776088noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3744768872499365778.post-63782228216425787912012-12-23T23:29:53.817-06:002012-12-23T23:29:53.817-06:00Super minor detail, but Hood wasn't on a cot h...Super minor detail, but Hood wasn't on a cot he was in a four poster bed at Oaklawn. He had been dragged and trod upon by his horse. I have some references in a paper I've been writing on those seven days where Hood did give the order for the pike to be cut off. If you are interested, I'd love to send you my sources. I found a ridiculous amount of primary sources and journal entries online through the archives and other dedicated lovers of history. ParaWrittenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10200779803458132414noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3744768872499365778.post-69364570696300239992012-01-01T12:47:25.103-06:002012-01-01T12:47:25.103-06:00This was a well written piece. Hood's campaign...This was a well written piece. Hood's campaign is overlooked so much. This also shows that if successful it would caused great damage to Northern morale perhaps fatal if the Army of Tennessee would have made it to the Ohio River. Sherman's armies would have had to completely change their plans to counter Hood's. But it was all for not. Hood's original campaign aside from tardiness from Forrest and the supplies went really well. It was a great idea which never was fully accomplished by Hood. Hood's aggressiviness was overly blamed for things that happened like the Battle of Franklin. The biggest mistake was Spring Hill and Hood blamed everybody but himself for that failure which was clearly his. Some of the Union soldiers wandered into Confederate pickets to warm themselves when this was reported to Hood he should have ordered the pike cut but he didn't. But this already pointed out clearly by the piece. Thanks again.Dougnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3744768872499365778.post-58543029653061318552011-01-03T10:09:04.783-06:002011-01-03T10:09:04.783-06:00I agree with many of these points and, perhaps, di...I agree with many of these points and, perhaps, did not clearly communicate one essential element in Hood's campaign plans: desperation. Hood had few options and I agree that pursuing Sherman would not have resulted in anymore benefit than his eventual campaign into Tennessee and, yes, it might have had even worse results. In fact, precisely because of that and the seeming audacity of attacking north into Tennessee, I think his campaign was the only viable option. The eventual reaction to Hood's presence in central Tennessee by Lincoln, Grant, Stanton, and Grant supports that view. They saw disaster coming and Grant's later comments still reflect the sense pf near panic that gripped the Union leadership.<br /><br />Hood's campaign was born of absolute desperation and a lack of options. Given that, it was the best hope the South had to turn around what seemed a hopeless situation.Bobhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05632564881164776088noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3744768872499365778.post-74391639139112582112011-01-03T09:52:11.456-06:002011-01-03T09:52:11.456-06:00This is an excellent essay but the author, seeming...This is an excellent essay but the author, seemingly innocently, repeats some common myths about Hood that are either not supported by facts, or are complete conjecture.<br /><br />Hood's overall plan for the TN Campaign was not his alone, rather, it was developed and approved by Beauregard and Davis. The campaign, described by the author as "grandiose" was also called brilliant by others, including U.S. Grant. The details of the campaign were expressed by Beauregard in his letter to Davis of Dec. 6, 1864:<br />...I did not countermand the campaign in Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood’s army for the following reasons:<br />1st. The Roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa river across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and the wagon trains.<br />2nd. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had already the start about two hundred seventy five miles on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood’s army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.<br />3rd. To pursue Sherman, the passage of the Army of Tennessee would, necessarily, have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage; and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.<br />4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman, would have opened to Thomas’s force the richest portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.<br />...Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas’s army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon it’s limited resources.<br />This letter followed brief telegrams exchanged between Beaureagrd and Davis a few weeks earlier.<br /><br />Beauregard to Davis, Macon GA Nov 24, 1864, “Have ordered Gen Hood to take active offensive in Middle Tennessee to relieve Gen. Lee.” <br /><br />On Nov 30, Davis replied "Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy, he can scarcely change the plans of Sherman's or Grant's campaigns." <br /><br />“If I had been in Hood’s place,” Grant wrote in his memoirs, "I would have gone to Louisville and on north until I came to Chicago…We would have had to raise new levies. I was never so anxious during the war as at that time.”<br /><br />Hood's delays in northern Alabama were due to Richard Taylor's inability to get supplies to Hood, and also the delay of the arrival of Forrest. However, Forrest's tardiness was not due to heavy rains, rather, Taylor took several days to contact Forrest, and told him to find Hood only when he had finished his current work. Forrest had no idea of the unrgency, and took over three weeks to join the Army of Tennessee. All the while, neither Hood nor Beauregard received any correspondence from Forrest.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3744768872499365778.post-71376371507509958552011-01-03T06:01:42.116-06:002011-01-03T06:01:42.116-06:00Another fantastic piece from the Author! I especi...Another fantastic piece from the Author! I especially liked the way you gave your opinion of John Hood being "passionate" above all of the other words used to describe him. Very appropriate.<br /><br />I can't wait for Part II as you leave us wanting and waiting for more, more, more, please! :-)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com